

President Reagan's Answers in Interview With Five R

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Some of them seem to be less than enchanted with the idea of spending cuts but all for the tax cuts.

A. I have tried to meet with them, as well as our own people, and there seems to be a feeling on the part of many of them that they know and they think they're reading the public pulse also. And they know that the people out there — they want something done.

Q. Would you veto your own tax cut if you don't get the spending cuts?

A. I'm not going to answer that either.

Q. Do you have any sense, Mr. President, of getting a grip on this Government at all? You've had numerous Cabinet meetings now, and you must have some feel of that pulse out there in the bureaucracy. Are you going to be able to manage them — to really get cuts, effective cuts?

A. Well, I think we can. And I know in the last few days we've seen the bureaucracy start to fight back. And it's not unexpected. Oh, suddenly these — the terrible thing of the — they call it the retroactive freeze on employment. It isn't retroactive at all. It's effective Jan. 20.

But it's strange to notice how many employees the bureaucrats had recruited right after Nov. 4 and didn't have in place by Jan. 20. It does seem a long time to get a man into a job once you've told him to sell his home and move to Washington and quit.

And I think you're seeing something of bureaucracy's method. And then suddenly you fellows are provided with all the horror tales that they can find. And legitimate cases of someone for whom it has been a hardship. We've now given the guidelines for the hardship cases.

But we did not say that people couldn't be hired back to Nov. 4; we made it as of Jan. 20 no one could be hired.

And I think there've been other indications that — the regulations, for example. Our holding up the new regulations that had not been implemented until we could get a look at them. And suddenly we're hearing all the stories of: Well, this regulation, this is going to cause a disaster because this was correcting a wrong regulation that we had. Well if it is, we'll look at it and let it go through.

But I experienced that when I was Governor.

crease. In other words, it's not saying, "We're now going to spend less in foreign aid than we've been spending." It

was to say crease to planned."

Comments on So

Q. Mr. President, why such harsh language in your press conference about the Soviet Union?

A. I would hope by now that they hadn't asked the question. They asked that question. Well the question they asked was, what was my thinking — what did I think were the aims in the future of the Soviet Union. And I answered by saying that it didn't matter what I thought. They, themselves, have told us what their aims are.

And then I recited what every Russian leader, including the present one, has assured the Communist congresses is their intention of world domination through world rule of Communist states. And I also added that in our dealings with them we've got to recognize that they have been equally frank in telling us that their morality is.

They don't subscribe to our sense of morality; because they don't believe in any of the things — they don't believe in afterlife; they don't believe in a God or a religion. And that the only morality they recognize, therefore, is what will advance the cause of socialism. And thus they reserve unto themselves the right to do anything that will advance it and that's not immoral.

Now, they've come snarling back at me and charged me with lies and everything else. But, I haven't heard them refute what I said.

Q. Mr. President, can we resume negotiations with the Russians on a SALT treaty, and is it based on how much improvement we've made in our strengthening our own defenses before we could resume negotiations?

A. I've told the State Department that I have no timetable with regard to discussions that might lead towards future negotiations; because, as I said all through the campaign, anytime they want to sit down and discuss a legiti-

mate redu I'm willing tions.

Q. Mr. Pr appears to be the West Ba that? And, s handed polic

A. I belie moral comm see that the s continue livi that, and th bound to that it's also a two

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Strength in the Mideast

Q. Mr. President, to change the subject just for a moment, you've indicated, or I think you've hinted, that you would use arms to prevent any Soviet move in the Persian Gulf to cut off oil to the United States. My question is, are we capable, now, militarily, of backing up that threat?

A. Well, no, now. It was the President that said, during the campaign, we'd use armed force in the Persian Gulf area. And at the time, I said that he had to admit a short time later that we didn't have the force to do this.

What I have called for, and what I think is needed as we refurbish our capability, is a presence in the Middle East. And I think this is something we ought to also take up with our own allies in Europe, because there would be total disaster to the European economy if there was an interference with the energy supply; they're far more dependent on it than we are.

But what I meant by a presence was that — not the stationing —

Q. That's what I was referring to, this presence.

A. Yes. (Not the stationing of enough American troops that you say we could stop the Soviet Union if they set out to advance logistically; we know that we couldn't do that.)

What is meant by a presence is that we're there enough to know and for the Soviets to know that if they made a reckless move, they would be risking a confrontation with the United States.

Q. Why wouldn't that be — that such a presence, though, if there isn't the military to back it up — be an empty threat that the Soviets could see through?

A. Well, it's not — you don't just plant a flag in the ground and walk away and leave it. There would be Americans there. But I think there should be some kind of American presence. Well, we're doing it right now with the Navy in the

Indian Ocean. But I think we need a ground presence also.

But it's based on the assumption — and I think a correct assumption — the Soviet Union is not ready yet to take on that confrontation which could become World War III. They would like to be able to continue making gains without conflict. And I think that a presence there indicates that, all right, this is of interest to our national security, our presence there. And they're going to have to take that into their computations.

Q. Mr. President, is not the foreign aid bill essential to that presence?

A. I'm quite sure it. Yes, I'm quite sure it does figure in there. And here again is another little case of bureaucracy at work. The whole panic about the foreign aid measure. We set up a process whereby Dave Stockman is to review the budget and come in with the proposed cuts that we can make. Then he is, before this ever gets to me, he's to take these up with the Cabinet officers that are directly involved. And they work on this whole project. Finally, it comes to the entire Cabinet and myself for everyone's input. And finally, my decision.

And let me say in the Cabinet process, I do not envision that that includes taking a vote. I want all the counsel and advice I can get, but I know that I have to make the decision.

But what Dave Stockman had — this was at the first stage of this process, but someone threw this out as if it was an accomplished fact and that we had decided to do this. No decision has been made.

But also, I think, in Dave's behalf, it must be pointed out that the Carter Administration has left us with a 34 percent increase in that program, in foreign aid, in the 1982 budget.

Thirty-four percent, and his cuts seem simply a reduction of that in-

Attitude on P.L.O.

Q. Just about the moral obligation toward Israel, do you have any sympathy toward the Palestinians or any moral feeling toward them and their aspirations?

A. I know that that's got to be a part of any settlement. I think in arriving at that, here again, there is the outspoken utterance that Israel doesn't have a right to exist; there is the terrorism that is being practiced by the P.L.O. I never thought that the P.L.O. had ever been elected by the Palestinians. Maybe it is recognized by them as their leadership, but I've never seen that that's been definitely established.

But, again, it starts with the acceptance of Israel as a nation.

Q. Having had a chance to look over the agreement with Iran on the hostages, would you have signed that had you been President?

A. Well, Lyn Nofziger taught me once that I should never answer a question that begins with "if." Well, it's a hypothetical question. Let me say that I just believe that we got off on the wrong track in those negotiations to begin with. The negotiations started from the

standpoint — well, reply that we ma reply — there would until the hostages v then we violated tha negotiations. But it ating the other fello they were the kidn the ones who broke who committed, ac war.

And it seems to m there, someplace, we demand, also; that s talk about our dem price that we put on vo

So I don't think I

Q. Is there any wa could prolong this wor spirit that the hostages the last few days.

A. I hope so. I think t hungry for it and I just remembering more a Teddy Roosevelt said th Presidency, is a bully hope for whatever I can cation to bring that or ke

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

A special note should be made of the implicit, and sometimes explicit, threat to use nuclear weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons are deployed abroad for use in tactical warfare. The Seventh Army in Germany and the Eighth Army in South Korea have included units equipped with short-range surface-to-surface missiles; Air Force tactical squadrons deployed in Europe and Asia have maintained stocks of nuclear ordnance. Warships often have nuclear warheads on board for surface-to-air missiles and antisubmarine weapons; aircraft carriers may carry nuclear air-to-ground ordnance. Consequently, any movement or other involvement of these forces in an incident (may imply), in one sense, a nuclear signal. But because these forces are primarily for conventional warfare their involvement does not necessarily imply that U.S. decisionmakers intended a nuclear threat. There are other forces, however, which play a primary role in plans for strategic nuclear war against the Soviet Union, and the involvement of one of these units would be open to interpretation as a nuclear threat. For this reason we have noted whenever a force, which at the time had a designated role in U.S. plans for strategic nuclear war, took part in one of the political incidents in such context that a nuclear signal of some type could be inferred. There were nineteen such incidents (table 2-8), including five distinct subtypes:

1. An overt and explicit threat was directed at the USSR through global actions of U.S. strategic forces in four incidents—the Suez, Lebanon, and Cuban missile crises and the October 1973 war in the Middle East. The small number of these incidents demonstrates the relative caution with which U.S. decisionmakers have approached the risk of nuclear war.

2. In ten incidents Air Force strategic bombers were moved either closer to the Soviet Union or China, placed on increased alert, or their withdrawal from a region abroad was delayed, in the context of U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Chinese tension. Six of these incidents occurred in Europe, the first in 1946 when, after a U.S. aircraft was downed over Yugoslavia, six B-29s were deployed to Germany and rather ostentatiously flew along the border. Such a display was repeated on three other occasions in 1948, related to Berlin incidents. The fifth occurred in 1950 when, in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. strategic bombers were

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hiding?

carriers!

Berlin!

But when accompanied by
threats or links...

Table 2-8. Incidents in Which Strategic Nuclear Forces Were Involved

Incident	Date
U.S. aircraft shot down by Yugoslavia	November 1946
Inauguration of president in Uruguay	February 1947
Security of Berlin	January 1948
Security of Berlin	April 1948
Security of Berlin	June 1948
Korean War: Security of Europe	July 1950
Security of Japan/South Korea	August 1953
Guatemala accepts Soviet bloc support	May 1954
China-Taiwan conflict: Tachen Islands	August 1954
Suez crisis	October 1956
Political crisis in Lebanon	July 1958
Political crisis in Jordan	July 1958
China-Taiwan conflict: Quemoy and Matsu	July 1958
Security of Berlin	May 1959
Security of Berlin	June 1961
Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba	October 1962
Withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey	April 1963
<i>Pueblo</i> seized by North Korea	January 1968
Arab-Israeli War	October 1973

stationed in Europe. The last of them occurred during the Berlin crisis of 1961, when the planned withdrawal of B-47s from Europe was delayed.

Deployment of U.S. strategic aircraft to the Western Pacific occurred four times—once to reassure South Korea and Japan in connection with the end of the Korean War, twice during China-Taiwan offshore islands crises, and finally during the *Pueblo* crisis.

3. In two incidents—Jordan in 1958 and the 1958–59 Berlin crisis—Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers, then playing a key role in U.S. strategic strike plans, were used to help attain political objectives.

4. In two peculiar incidents, U.S. long-range bombers assigned to the Strategic Air Command were flown to nations in the Western Hemisphere (Uruguay in 1947 and Nicaragua in 1954), apparently to reassure U.S. allies. The Nicaragua case makes some sense perhaps, insofar as it occurred in connection with maneuvers to overthrow the Soviet-supported Arbenz government in Guatemala.

5. Finally, in one case a U.S. strategic submarine, the *Sam Houston*, was used to reassure a U.S. ally. In 1963, following the withdrawal of U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Turkey, the *Sam Houston* visited Izmir. That port visit, the only such visit to a foreign port by a

U.S. strategic submarine to Turkey the region.

In short, the use of strategic nuclear forces over, their use was in a strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. One-half of the years (one-third) of the first fifteen years (of the Cold War) there were only two incidents.

Again, remembering the political uses of nuclear forces overseas, strategic nuclear forces on a continuous basis, perhaps for deterrence utilization.

Levels of Force Utilization

Variations in the levels of force involved in the incidents, make it difficult to compare involvement in terms of force. To alleviate this difficulty, historical data, roughly categorized, when combatant nations were included one carrier, one submarine, considered to constitute one level of force. When the incident was considered only a "minor" commitment, only ground forces²⁰ and table 2-9. Granted, in terms of manpower the point. What the "military level of effort."

20. Army and Marine Corps.

21. That is, Air Force.

U.S. strategic submarine that we know of, clearly was meant to demonstrate to Turkey that the United States retained a strategic presence in the region.

In short, the United States has used nuclear threats sparingly; moreover, their use was more common in earlier years—when the U.S. strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was dominant—than more recently. One-half of the nuclear incidents occurred during the first ten years (one-third) of the study period. Three-fourths occurred during the first fifteen years (one-half) of the study period. During the last ten years, there were only two incidents involving strategic nuclear threats.

Again, remember that the references above relate solely to discrete political uses of nuclear weapons. Like Army ground troops deployed overseas, strategic nuclear forces serve vital political objectives on a continuous basis, perhaps thus obviating the need for discrete and explicit utilization.

Levels of Force Used in Incidents

Variations in the types and size of military units which have been involved in the incidents, and the infrequent inclusion of strategic nuclear forces, make it difficult to discuss in the aggregate the significance of the involvement in terms of the level of force mustered by the United States. To alleviate this difficulty a scale was constructed which, based on the historical data, roughly ranked "military level of effort." For example, when combatant naval forces were involved in an incident they typically included one carrier task group. A carrier task group was therefore considered to constitute the "standard" naval force component. The use of two or more carriers in an incident constituted a "major" component of force. When the naval forces did not include an aircraft carrier, the incident was considered to have been less significant in that it required only a "minor" component of force. Similar assessments were made for ground forces²⁰ and land-based air forces,²¹ with the results shown in table 2-9. Granted, the units listed for each rank are quite different in terms of manpower or any other measure of size. However, that is not the point. What the classification does is to provide a rough ranking of "military level of effort" based on aggregate past experience.

20. Army and Marine Corps units.

21. That is, Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft.

THE ENDS OF POWER

H.R. HALDEMAN

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Inauguration day, a cold morning in the Capital, Nixon looked out over a country torn by wartime dissension. He told Americans it was time to "lower our voices." He said he would free politics "from inflated rhetoric that promises more than it can deliver; from angry rhetoric that fans discontents into hatred; from bombastic rhetoric that postures instead of persuading." Regarding the war in Vietnam, he said, "The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker. . . . We have endured a long night of the American spirit . . . but let us not curse the remaining dark. Let us gather the light."

When Nixon spoke of his desire to be a peacemaker, he was not just delivering words his listeners wanted to hear. Nixon not only *wanted* to end the Vietnam War, he was absolutely convinced he *would* end it in his first year. I remember during the campaign, walking along a beach, he once said, "I'm the one man in this country who can do it, Bob."

What he meant was that in 1968 the Communists feared Nixon above all other politicians in U.S. public life. And Nixon intended to manipulate that fear to bring an end to the War. The Communists regarded him as an uncompromising enemy whose hatred for their philosophy had been spelled out over and over again in two decades of public life. Nixon saw his advantage in that fact. "They'll believe any threat of force that Nixon makes because it's Nixon," he said.

He saw a parallel in the action President Eisenhower had taken to end another war. When Eisenhower arrived in the White House, the Korean War was stalemated. Eisenhower ended the impasse in a hurry. He secretly got word to the Chinese that he would drop nuclear bombs on North Korea unless a truce was signed immediately. In a few weeks, the Chinese called for a truce and the Korean War ended.

In the 1950s Eisenhower's military background had con-

The War—and the Wires

vinced the Communists that he was sincere in his threat. Nixon didn't have that background, but he believed his hard-line anti-Communist rhetoric of twenty years would serve to convince the North Vietnamese equally as well that he really meant to do what he said. He expected to utilize the same principle of a threat of excessive force. He would combine that threat with more generous offers of financial aid to the North Vietnamese than they had ever received before. And with this combination of a strong warning plus unprecedented generosity, he was certain he could force the North Vietnamese—at long last—into legitimate peace negotiations.

The threat was the key, and Nixon coined a phrase for his theory which I'm sure will bring smiles of delight to Nixon-haters everywhere. We were walking along a foggy beach after a long day of speechwriting. He said, "I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do *anything* to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button'—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace."

As it turned out it wasn't Bill Rogers, the future Secretary of State, who slipped the word to the North Vietnamese, but a brilliant, impulsive, witty gentleman with an engaging German accent—Henry Kissinger.

Kissinger became a member of the White House team because Nixon, in common with almost every President in history, had no love for the U.S. State Department. Franklin D. Roosevelt once said that dealing with the State Department is like watching an elephant become pregnant. Everything's done on a very high level, there's a lot of commotion, and it takes twenty-two months for anything to happen.

Nixon, himself, intended to run foreign policy from the White House, as had Roosevelt. So he decided to install a Presidential assistant who would be chief of the National Security Council, and work directly under him in the White House.

an American air strike to save the French. General Nathan Twining, chief of the Air Force, later told how it would have been done:

I still think it would have been a good idea [to have taken] three small tactical A-bombs—it's a fairly isolated area, Dienbienphu—no great town around there, only Communists and their supplies. You could take all day to drop a bomb, make sure you put it in the right place. No opposition. And clean those Commies out of there and the band could play the Marseillaise and the French could march out of Dienbienphu in fine shape. And those Commies would say, "Well, those guys might do this again to us. We'd better be careful." And we might not have had this problem we're facing in Vietnam now if we'd dropped those small A-weapons.⁴⁶

Gen. Nathan Twining, oral history Dulles project, Princeton

Eisenhower appeared to waver. Within the Administration General Matthew Ridgway, the Army chief of staff, weighed in forcefully against intervention. As the man who pulled the bacon out of the fire in Korea, he was not without prestige. As Army chief he was in a position to send a dozen staff officers to take a hard look at the actual scene. They reported problems of logistics and supply that argued a single American bombing attack could not accomplish much. Saving the French would require six American divisions and a total of 600,000 men—just about what General Westmoreland said he needed to win twelve years later. Ridgway made sure these reports reached Eisenhower, the one man best qualified to assess their weight.⁴⁷

On April 3 Dulles nonetheless informed congressional leaders that the Administration wanted a resolution passed authorizing commitment of American forces. The representatives and senators said that first the French must grant Indochinese independence. But when they learned that the Joint Chiefs were split and that the Allies had not been consulted, they held off. Tentatively therefore Eisenhower ruled against American intervention. But to meet the objection that the Allies had not given approval, a message went out to Churchill from Eisenhower next day comparing the threat in Indochina with the dangers of "Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler," and urging the British to join in a coalition to prevent a catastrophe in Asia.⁴⁸

"The United States," Dulles informed the American ambassador to France, "is doing everything possible to prepare public, congressional and constitutional basis for united action in Indochina." To this end Eisenhower flashed the same kind of signal to the American people that the Truman administration had sent out seven years before in urging support for Greece and Turkey. That time it was Acheson, pulling out all the

Carl Solberg, Riding High

said he had a "clear and definite" formula for ending the Korean War without "increased danger of provoking the Communists." MacArthur would not say to the public what his plan was, but he offered to give it to Eisenhower in private.

Eisenhower immediately sent word to MacArthur that he would be glad to meet with him when he returned to the United States. MacArthur's reply of thanks to Eisenhower included a back-handed slap at Truman, the President who had relieved him of his command in the Far East. "This is the first time that the slightest official interest in my counsel has been evidenced since my return," MacArthur said.

Truman read this exchange on his way back to Washington from his mother-in-law's funeral in Missouri. He lost no time issuing a heated statement suggesting that if MacArthur had a plan for ending the Korean War it should be submitted at once to the proper authorities in the government. The next day at a press conference he lit into both MacArthur and Eisenhower, doubting that MacArthur had any kind of a workable plan and charging that Eisenhower's trip to Korea was political demagoguery.

Soon after Eisenhower returned to New York he met with MacArthur but they never disclosed the plan. I was curious about it, along with everybody else, but I never asked Eisenhower what it was until I visited him in Newport last summer a few months before he went out of office.

The solution was a precisely stated intention to drop an atom bomb after full notification to the North Koreans of our purposes. MacArthur was sure that there was not the remotest chance we would actually have to carry out our threat; the Communists would simply throw up their hands and the war would be over. Although not as blunt and specific as MacArthur had suggested, it was indeed the threat of atomic attack that eventually did bring the Korean War to an end on July 26, 1953.

That spring we moved atomic missiles to Okinawa. In May, during talks with Nehru in India, Dulles said that the United States could not be held responsible for failing to use atomic weapons if a truce could not be arranged. This message was planted deliberately in India so that it would get to the Chinese Communists, as it did. Long afterward, talking one day with Eisenhower about the events that led up finally to the truce in Korea, I asked him what it was that brought

the Communists into line. "Danger of an atomic war," he said without hesitation. "We told them we could not hold it to a limited war any longer if the Communists welched on a treaty of truce. They didn't want a full-scale war or an atomic attack. That kept them under some control."

were not fired if winds at the 30,000-to-45,000-foot altitude were blowing in the direction of St. George or Las Vegas. Shots also were postponed, he explained, if rain was forecast within the area.

Commissioner M. W. Boyer bluntly asked Graves whether "the fact that the test organization is under pressure to meet the test schedule makes them more apt to take chances when they are running behind." "No chances are taken," replied Graves insistently, "in order to meet the schedule." Dean ordered Graves to make sure that he conveyed the commission's concern that "everything be done to avoid another fallout over St. George."

One participant in the meeting, recently promoted Brigadier General K. E. Fields, seemed almost deaf to the worried discussion about fallout in Nevada. He interrupted Dean to remind the chairman that if the eleventh shot at the test site was going to be fired, an announcement had to be made. Eugene Zuckert, one of the more cautious members of the board, refused to be rushed to a decision by the general. He told his fellow commissioners that the fallout incident at St. George, the claims of livestock deaths near the test site and allegations that the bomb blasts were adversely affecting weather conditions "makes me fear the effect of testing a device at Nevada considerably larger than any previously fired there."

"A serious psychological problem has arisen," Zuckert declared, "and the AEC must be prepared to study an alternate to holding future tests at the Nevada Test Site. In the present frame of mind of the public, it would take only a single illogical and unforeseeable accident to preclude holding any future tests in the U.S."

Commissioner Smyth wasn't quite convinced the blast would be dangerous, since the test could be delayed until weather conditions were perfect. But Smyth agreed with Zuckert's concern about the "public relations aspects of the tests." Zuckert pointed out that though Eisenhower had already approved a routine request for the fissionable material necessary for the eleventh bomb, "the request did not inform him of the magnitude of the shot or the possible dangers involved." Zuckert suggested telling Ike's new special assistant on atomic energy, Lewis Strauss, about the possible problems that could crop up with the eleventh blast.

"Zuckert is very unhappy over it [the eleventh shot] in terms of public relations," Dean wrote in his personal diary later that day. But the

Howard Rosenberg
1953

commissioner noted for posterity that he told his fellow commissioners that the test was "so important, we will have to go ahead. We just have to take a chance."

According to the diary, Strauss called Dean the following Monday and left him a message. "Assuming that it will not take as long as I was told to set the test up for the 'picnic grounds' [Eniwetok] and that the maximum delay would be of the order say of a month and a half, would it not be better," Strauss reportedly asked, "to accept that, rather than run the risk of a situation which might make all future continental tests impossible?"

Dean's diary also records a telephone conversation the two men had the next day discussing the merits of the eleventh shot. "I think on evaluation," Dean said, "you will find this less risky than ones we have shot before because of the energy release." Dean told Strauss that Eniwetok posed certain problems. "Some aircraft cannot be flown there," Dean argued, "and a two-month delay would be too late." "I see what you mean," Strauss replied, and promised Dean that he would "get to him [Eisenhower] and get an answer if I can."

Strauss called Dean again on May 27 to tell him that Eisenhower had approved the extra test. The chairman immediately passed on the news to his public relations expert, Morse Salisbury, along with some added instructions. According to his diary, Dean advised the P.R. man that in the meeting with Strauss that morning, "the President expressed some concern, not too serious, but made the suggestion that we leave 'thermonuclear' out of our press releases and speeches. Also 'fusion' and 'hydrogen'. The President says," Dean told Salisbury, "keep them confused as to 'fission' and 'fusion.'"

Apparently, the unscheduled eleventh shot of the Upshot-Knothole series might have been a test of one of the nation's first workable hydrogen bombs. The exact yield and type of the bomb was never listed on the government's official compilation of "announced nuclear tests." Whether Eisenhower wanted to confuse the Russians or the American people about the nature of the bomb is unclear. Strauss, Dean and Eisenhower all took the answer to that question with them to their graves.

The natives in the regions surrounding the Nevada Test Site were becoming restless. The bomb blasts were blamed for everything from changes in weather patterns to the death of sheep and cattle grazing on nearby lands. In one case, several cattle in a field near Charleston Peak were reported to have died from radiation poisoning. Veterinarians from